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Introduction
The concept of freedom is strongly ambiguous: it
has many different meanings which come into
complex relationships. It seems that a good point
of departure for disentangling these meanings is
making a distinction between freedom as a fact
and freedom as a value. The former type of free-
dom has a purely descriptive sense: it describes,
so to speak, a “metaphysical condition” of man.
The basic controversy in this context is whether
human beings have free will (which is the capacity
to make choices undetermined by past events) or
whether the only type of freedom inscribed in
their “metaphysical condition” is freedom from
compulsion (which consists in acting in accor-
dance with one’s desires and beliefs and is
compromised either when an agent is coerced
into doing an act by some other agent or if she
suffers from some mental disease, deﬁciency, or
disturbance that makes her incapable of recogniz-
ing the signiﬁcance of her act and/or controlling
her conduct). This controversy, essential for the
philosophy of criminal law (and more speciﬁcally,
for the question about the conditions of moral and
legal responsibility), will not be a focus of this
article. Its focus will be freedom as a value, i.e.,
the type of freedom which is or can be an object of
human aspirations and, consequently, is or can be
pursued by means of law (by contrast, freedom as
a fact cannot be aspired to; either human beings
are endowed with free will or can be free only in
the sense of freedom from compulsion). One can
distinguish four types of freedom as value, viz.,
negative freedom (i.e., freedom as non-
interference), freedom as non-domination, politi-
cal freedom, and positive freedom. The article will
aim at presenting them and analyzing their mutual
relationships.
Freedom as Noninterference (Negative
Freedom) and Freedom as
Non-domination
The basis for the distinction between freedom as
noninterference (negative freedom) and freedom
as non-domination – two types of freedom which
are usually opposed to each other – is the question
about the conditions under which one can plausi-
bly say that freedom is violated. The adherents of
freedom as noninterference claim that freedom is
undermined in the case of the actual interference
into a subject’s sphere of choices, whereas the
adherents of freedom as non-domination claim
that the very possibility of interference, i.e., poten-
tial interference with an agent’s sphere of choices,
constitutes a diminution of her freedom (Pettit
1996, 1997).
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The famous formulation of freedom as non-
interference (negative freedom) comes from Isa-
iah Berlin who claimed that being free is
equivalent to enjoying a state of lack of coercion,
i.e., “the deliberate interference of other human
beings within the area in which I could otherwise
act” (Berlin 2000: 194). Interference, if thus
understood, is a deliberate encroachment aimed
at worsening a subject’s situation of choice. This
manner of thinking about freedom can be, in gen-
eral, attributed to the representatives of the liberal
tradition (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Mill, or von
Hayek). For instance, in Thomas Hobbes’s formu-
lation, a free man is the one who can act in accor-
dance with his wit or strength without
impediments (Hobbes 1996: 146). In a likewise
manner, Friedrich August von Hayek deﬁnes free-
dom as the absence of coercion, where coercion is
understood as a state “when one man’s actions are
made to serve another man’s will, not for his own
but for other’s purpose” (Hayek 2011: 199).
Needless to say, the acceptance of the conception
of freedom as noninterference does not entail the
support for the unlimited sphere of this freedom.
Maximal negative freedom, i.e., unrestrained by
any external (e.g., legal) regulations, would turn
into its opposite – a state of minimal negative
freedom in which all could interfere with one
another’s choices without impediment. Thus,
although the supporters of negative freedom con-
sider legal and political institutions as a limitation
of liberty, they acknowledge its necessity.
The supporters of freedom as non-domination
draw attention to the insufﬁciency of freedom as
noninterference. Although the idea of non-
domination has been thoroughly examined and
developed in Philip Pettit’s works, it is not a
contemporary conception (Pettit 1997).
According to Pettit, equating freedom with non-
domination is a trademark of republican political
thinkers, such as Machiavelli, Harrington, or
Montesquieu. The republicans oppose freedom
to domination, i.e., a state of arbitrary interfer-
ence of one party into the affairs of another under-
taken at will and with impunity, where
arbitrariness is understood as the lack of “refer-
ence to the interests, or the opinions, of those
affected” (Pettit 1997: 55). Pettit illustrates the
distinction with a master-slave scenario: the
slave may have a benignant master who does not
interfere with his activities. For the proponents of
freedom as noninterference, this alone would be
sufﬁcient to claim that slave’s freedom is not
compromised. However, the master could alter
his conduct and interfere with slave’s affairs on
an arbitrary basis and with impunity. This state of
being at the mercy of the other person is tanta-
mount to unfreedom according to the adherents of
freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997: 22–23).
In this point, freedom as non-domination proves
to be a wider or stronger ideal than freedom as
noninterference, as it implies that liberty is
compromised not only by actual but also by
potential interference. However, saying that free-
dom as non-domination is an extension or
strengthening of freedom as noninterference
would not be fully apt, since, as is emphasized
by Pettit, acts of interference are not regarded by
the adherents of freedom of non-domination as
infringements thereof unless they have a dominat-
ing character. It should be noted that if, as the
republicans claim, unfreedom of an agent is cor-
related with the other agent’s (who may be an
individual but also institutions) capacity to exer-
cise arbitrary power over her sphere of choices,
the question arises as to the means by which
freedom as non-domination can be secured. The
republicans assert that freedom as non-
domination can be most effectively secured by
properly designed legal and political institutions,
i.e., based on such measures as the separation of
powers, checks and balances, or the rule of law.
These measures minimize political domination,
i.e., domination in the sphere of relations between
the citizens and the state. However, as is empha-
sized in the more contemporary works in the
republican tradition, for freedom as non-
domination to be fully realized, also social domi-
nation, i.e., domination in the social relations,
must be diminished. Social domination results
from the glaring inequalities in social and eco-
nomic status. Thus, contemporary supporters of
non-domination acknowledge that fulﬁlling this
ideal requires certain means of promoting per-
sonal independence and economic prosperity
(Pettit 1997: 158–165). For instance, according
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to Frank Lovett, non-domination demands some
form of distributive justice, e.g., guaranteeing for
each citizen unconditional basic income (Lovett
2009).
It is worth noting at the end of this section that,
at the general level, there exists no fundamental
disparity between the approaches to law by the
supporters of freedom as noninterference and the
supporters of freedom of non-domination. Both
would agree in the crucial point, namely, that law
is effective in realizing the type of freedom they
adhere to. However, some subtle differences exist
between them. Firstly, while the former claim that
law, although effective in securing a possibly
large amount of negative freedom, constitutes
nonetheless its infringement, the latter do not
deﬁnitionally oppose law and freedom and
thereby do not depict being under the protective
legal and political institutions as a form of a lim-
itation of freedom as non-domination. Secondly,
while the former assume that law is an effective
but not necessary way of generating a possibly
large sphere of negative freedom, the latter (given
their claim about the deﬁnitional connection
between law and freedom) assert that law is a
necessary means for realizing freedom as
non-domination.
Political Freedom
The notion of freedom as non-domination draws
attention to the connection between freedom and
politics (viz., that liberty requires protective legal
and political institutions), but it does not exhaust
all of the possibilities of achieving liberty through
politics. Political freedom in a stricter sense is
associated with political action, i.e., a possibility
to participate in governance. The conception of
political freedom thus understood can be broader
or narrower depending on the scope of participa-
tion in the political life of community. The broad
conception of political freedom is characteristic
for the ancient Athenian model of politics. The
ancient liberty “consisted in exercising collec-
tively, but directly, several parts of the complete
sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square,
over war and peace; in forming alliances with the
foreign governments; in voting laws; in pronounc-
ing judgments; in examining the accounts, the
acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in calling
them to appear in front of the assembled people, in
accusing, condemning or absolving them”
(Constant 1988: 311). Thus, ancient political free-
dom encompassed an extensive bundle of political
rights. However, such conception could not be
sustained in the modern and contemporary era
due to the transformations in the sociopolitical
conditions, e.g., to the emergence of mass socie-
ties. For this reason, the idea of direct participation
of all citizens in governance has been replaced by
the support for representation (among contempo-
rary philosophers, it was Hannah Arendt (1958)
who – despite certain reservations – supported the
ideal of wide political participation in the public
realm). Moreover, the support for the ideal of
representation stemmed from disbelief that the
majority could make reasonable decisions and
from the fear of what Alexis de Tocqueville
labeled as “the tyranny of the majority,” taking
place when the majority of citizens forces its
demands upon minority without taking into con-
sideration (or even at the expense of) its needs and
interests (Tocqueville 2000: 239–241). For this
reason, in the contemporary times, political free-
dom is mainly associated with the participation in
electing political representatives and participating
in other direct forms of political decision-making
(such as referendums). Participation in certain
forms of expressing political convictions, such
as manifestations, is also a form of political free-
dom (although it is at the same time an individual
right). Political freedom thus understood is one of
the chief democratic values, partly due to its close
relationship with the abovementioned concep-
tions of freedom, viz., noninterference and non-
domination. Expressing political attitudes and
participating in public governance can be one of
the means of securing both kinds of freedom, as in
public participation and deliberation citizens man-
ifest their consent and dissent toward legal author-
ities and express their opinions as to legal
regulations, thereby setting the boundaries for
the legal intervention in social life. However, the
supporters of the theory of non-domination attach
greater value to the institutional safeguards to
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freedom than the supporters of freedom as non-
interference, although, as it should be empha-
sized, both the former and the latter are skeptical
toward a broad (Athenian) model of political free-
dom (their skepticism stems mainly from their
fear of the tyranny of the majority). It should not
be thought, however, that there exists some fun-
damental disparity between political freedom, on
one hand, and negative freedom and freedom as
non-domination on the other. They cannot be rec-
onciled only if political freedom is understood in a
radical way – as enabling the citizens to make any
political decisions, i.e., if political freedom is
unrestrained by individual, inviolable rights.
Positive Freedom
Positive freedom is one of two concepts of free-
dom (the other being negative freedom, i.e., free-
dom as noninterference) analyzed by Isaiah Berlin
in his famous essay Two Concepts of Liberty. The
intuition that stands behind the distinction
between negative and positive freedom (the dis-
tinction deeply embedded in the history of West-
ern philosophy and thereby not invented by
Berlin) is that we can use the term “freedom” to
describe two markedly different phenomena:
either a situation which is external to an agent or
an internal state of an agent. In the former case, by
saying that an agent is free, we mean that she
would not encounter external (i.e., imposed by
other persons) constraints if she wanted to act on
various desires (those desires which she actually
has and which she could have as a human being).
In the latter case, by saying that an agent is free,
we mean that she “governs herself” or is a “true
master of herself.” There are two interesting dif-
ferences between these two concepts. The ﬁrst one
concerns the degree of their clarity: the concept of
negative freedom is clear and thereby needs no
explication, whereas the concept of positive free-
dom is notoriously unclear and thereby needs an
explication (and, consequently, one can formulate
various conceptions of positive freedom). The
second one concerns their cogency as a legal-
political value: whereas negative freedom is com-
monly accepted as an uncontroversial legal-
political value, many thinkers question the impor-
tance of positive freedom in legal-political sphere.
These two differences deserve a closer analysis.
The concept of positive freedom is notoriously
unclear: its deﬁnition – “being a true master of
oneself” or “governing oneself” – says very little
besides indicating that it refers to an internal state
of an agent. Accordingly, it needs to be developed
by stating what “governing itself” exactly consists
in. It is worth presenting (in very broad outline)
the main accounts (conceptions) of positive free-
dom proposed in the philosophical literature. The
ﬁrst account, which can be dubbed “Socratic,”
says that an agent is positively free only if her
beliefs – regarding herself as well as the external
world – are true beliefs. It follows from this
account (among other things) that a positively
free agent will not be prone to self-deception.
The second account, which comes from Plato,
says that an agent is positively free only if her
reason controls her passions. This account does
not require that our passions – the spirited
(thumoeides) and the appetitive (épithumêtikon)
part of our soul – should be extinguished but only
that they should be controlled by reason – the
rational (logistikon) part of our soul. The third
account, formulated by Stoics, says that an agent
is positively free only if she has reached the state
of apátheia, i.e., if she has extinguished her pas-
sions and, thereby, as was emphasized especially
by Epictetus, is not attached to things which are
not dependent “on us.” A Stoic sage who has
reached this state manifests amor fati: she does
not want to change the course of events that hap-
pen to her but accepts it as good. The fourth
account – Epicurean – implies that an agent is
positively free only if her desires are limited to
those which are natural and necessary; according
to this account, the widening of the scope of one’s
desires must lead to an inner enslavement. The
ﬁfth account – developed by St. Augustine and
other thinkers from the Christian tradition –
assumes an agent is free only if she makes morally
proper choices (an evil man is therefore by deﬁ-
nition positively unfree). The sixth account –
Nietzschean – says that an agent is positively
free only if she is not a “reactive person,” i.e., if
she is free from ressentiment. The seventh account
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(which can be called “procedural”) asserts that an
agent is positively free only if her goals – values to
be realized by her – have been formed in the
process not based on manipulation, pressure,
ignorance, deceit, etc. The eighth account, which
can be called “axiological,” says that an agent is
positively free only if her goals – values to be
realized by her – are of special kind: they are
high values. Three additional remarks seem to be
in order here. Firstly, none of these accounts,
when considered in isolation, seems to reﬂect the
whole richness of the phenomenon of positive
freedom; in order to build a concept of positive
freedom which would fully reﬂect this phenome-
non, one must arguably combine at least some of
the above – partial – accounts (which, with per-
haps some exceptions, are not mutually exclu-
sive). Secondly, as was mentioned in section
“Political Freedom,” Benjamin Constant called
political freedom “the freedom of the ancients.”
It seems, however, that this view should be qual-
iﬁed: given that the most inﬂuential and, perhaps,
also most mature conceptions of positive freedom
were formulated by the ancient philosophers and
that this concept of freedom was the main object
of their theoretical reﬂection, one could just as
well argue that it is positive freedom that can be
most aptly called “the freedom of the ancients”
(or that there are two “freedoms of the ancients”
that can be justiﬁably opposed to the “freedom of
the modern”). Thirdly, the concept of negative
freedom is clear, though, as was mentioned in
section “Freedom as Noninterference (Negative
Freedom) and Freedom as Non-domination,” it
is not quite certain what exactly is its relations
with the concept of freedom as non-domination.
One can supplement the analysis of these relations
conducted in section “Freedom as Non-
interference (Negative Freedom) and Freedom as
Non-domination” by noting that while negative
freedom unambiguously refers to an external sit-
uation of agent (describes, to put it metaphori-
cally, her “breathing space”) and positive
freedom unambiguously refers to an internal
state of an agent, freedom as non-domination
transcends or rather cuts across the distinction
“external situation-internal state”: since it is a
legally guaranteed status of an individual which
safeguards her negative freedom, it refers at the
same time to an external situation of an agent and,
in a sense, to his internal state (i.e., to the feeling
of security – which arises from awarding her a
legally guaranteed status – that the sphere of her
negative freedom will not be arbitrarily curtailed).
Regarding the second difference between neg-
ative freedom and positive freedom, negative
freedom, as was already mentioned, is commonly
accepted as an uncontroversial legal-political
value, though it is widely discussed how broad
the sphere of negative freedom ought to be. The
views proposed in this controversy (which is in
fact a controversy about the limits of legal inter-
vention in social life) range from the strongly
liberal (which assume John Stuart Mill’s “harm
principle”) to the strongly moralistic and paternal-
istic (which assume that the law, apart from pre-
venting harm to others, may enforce also those
moral norms which do not concern interpersonal
relations and interfere with the freedom of an
autonomous agent without her consent if the
agent’s welfare is thereby increased or protected
from decreasing). It is worth mentioning in this
context that the strongly liberal views, i.e., those
which imply that limitations of negative freedom
can be justiﬁed only if they in fact lead to the
increase of the amount of negative freedom in
society, can be of two different types. Within one
type, negative freedom is considered to be an
instrumental value, subservient to some intrinsic
value; within the other, negative freedom is
assumed to be an intrinsic value, that is, worthy
of pursing for itself. The most famous representa-
tive of the former view was John Stuart Mill who
assumed that negative freedom derives its value
from the fact that it contributes to the maximiza-
tion of utility, which he believed to be an intrinsic
value. The latter view was most fully developed
by Immanuel Kant who rejected any other ground
for the state coercion than the protection of nega-
tive freedom, which he called “the only inner
right” and deﬁned as “independence from being
constrained by another’s choice, insofar as it can
coexist with the freedom of every other in accor-
dance with a universal law” (Kant 1996: 30). He
emphatically opposed those who believed that the
state is justiﬁed in imposing any particular
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conception of happiness on citizens; he stressed
that any attempt at such an imposition would
amount to treating them as children, infringe
upon their negative freedom, and constitute an
offense to their “transcendental freedom,” i.e.,
free will (in which the value of negative freedom
is ultimately embedded). Positive freedom, in
contradistinction to negative freedom, is contro-
versial as a legal-political value. According to
Isaiah Berlin’s famous claim, it can be used by
the authorities to justify the imposition of consid-
erable limitations on citizens’ negative freedom.
The justiﬁcation might proceed in the following
way: since the citizens cannot achieve by their
own efforts the level of their “true or noumenal
selves” and thereby cannot be “true masters of
themselves,” they must be deprived of those
options which are likely to be selected by their
“empirical selves.” However, Berlin’s argument
that the concept positive freedom could be easily
used to justify encroachments into the sphere of
citizens’ negative freedom seems to be valid only
with reference to some accounts of positive free-
dom, namely, those that imply some form of the
distinction between the “true or noumenal self”
and “the empirical self,” not with reference to all
accounts of positive freedom. For instance, the
account of positive freedom which requires that
agents select their goals – values to be realized by
them – as a result of their autonomous delibera-
tions, i.e., deliberations pursued in the absence of
any external coercion, can hardly be invoked by
the authorities to justify the curtailment of the
sphere of negative freedom. But it must be admit-
ted that even if positive freedom was to be
regarded as a non-dangerous political ideal, it is
hard to imagine how it could be effectively real-
ized or promoted by the state. Moreover, andmore
importantly, one may argue that it is not possible
to reconcile liberalism (which assumes that the
state should not support any conception of good
life but, rather, should create conditions for devel-
oping various conceptions of good life) with the
suggestion that the state should pursue the ideal of
positive freedom – one of many (even if, for some
people, especially attractive) conceptions of
good life.
Conclusions
At the end, it is worth pointing at the conceptual
relations between law and various kinds of free-
dom distinguished in this article. Negative free-
dom and positive freedom, unlike freedom as non-
domination and political freedom, are conceptu-
ally independent on law, i.e., in their deﬁnitions,
no reference is made to law. This implies, of
course, that they need not be necessarily realized
by means of law. It remains the fact, though, that
law is arguably the most effective means of real-
izing negative freedom even if at the same time it
constitutes, according to the adherents of negative
freedom, infringement thereof (they admit, how-
ever, that, on balance, however, law may cause
and usually causes a “net gain” of negative free-
dom). Thus, realized (i.e., legally guaranteed)
negative freedom is equivalent to freedom as
non-domination, though, as was mentioned in
section “Freedom as Noninterference (Negative
Freedom) and Freedom as Non-domination,” the
phrase “legally guaranteed negative freedom” is
not a fully adequate deﬁnition of freedom as non-
domination. The problem of the factual relations
between positive freedom and law is much more
complex: it is neither clear whether positive free-
dom can at all be realized or favored by law nor
whether, if it could, such a realization would be
desirable (given Berlin’s misgivings about the
threat that positive freedom, when appealed to
by politicians, may constitute a threat to negative
liberty).
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